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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we present a Hierarchical Differential Evolution (HDE) algorithm for minimal cut set 
(mcs) identification of coherent and non-coherent Fault Trees (FTs). In realistic application of 
large-size systems, problems may be encountered in handling a large number of gates and events. 
In this work, to avoid any approximation, mcs identification is originally transformed into a 
hierarchical optimization problem, stated as the search for the minimum combination of cut sets 
that can guarantee the best coverage of all the minterms that make the system fail: during the first 
step of the iterative search, a multiple-population, parallel search policy is used to expedite the 
convergence of the second step of the exploration algorithm. The proposed hierarchical method is 
applied to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and to the 
the Airlock System (AS) of a CANadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor. Results are 
evaluated with respect to the accuracy and computational demand of the solution found.  
Keywords: Dynamic Reliability; Minimal Cut Sets (mcs); Fault Trees (FTs); Hierarchical 
Differential Evolution (HDE). 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fault Tree (FT) is a tool widely used in Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of Nuclear Power 
Plants (NPPs) [NUREG,  1983; NASA, 2002; Zio, 2007]. Traditionally, FTs are used for 
quantifying various probabilistic measures (including probabilities and/or frequencies of sequences, 
safety margins, importance factors and sensitivity indices) [Høyland et al., 1994; Kumamoto et al., 
1996; Epstein et al., 2005; Gao et al., 2007; Borgonovo, 2010]. The size of the system may 
challenge the FT analysis, in practical situations. For example, in the first case study considered in 
this work for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with 12 
components [Wash-1400, 1976], the minimal cut sets (mcs) identification problem gives rise to a 
FT structure function Φ composed by 212=4096 minterms (products of the literals α representing  
each component state, α=1 failed, α=0 safe), 485361 cut sets (combinations of components failures 
leading the system into failure) and a cut set chart (table with all minterms as columns and cut sets 
as rows) of 1966682772 elements. 
To overcome the problem, research efforts have developed in two directions: one looking for 
approximations of the probabilistic measures of interest obtained by considering only some selected 
mcs; another one developing computational methods to more efficiently assess the probabilistic 
measures from the exact mcs. One example of approximation consists in considering only small 
order mcs (i.e., mcs formed by a small number of elements) [Rauzy, 2001], which in principle 
capture the main part of the top-event probability. Another truncation process selects only the mcs 
with probability of occurrence larger than a given threshold. However, mcs truncation can have 
direct consequences on the safety level of the NPP, because it is not known how many are the mcs 
neglected (because of small order or probability) in the estimation of the risk/safety indicators of 
interest. For this reason, it has been pointed out that mcs exact identification (rather than truncation) 
is one of the technical issues to be tackled in the development of PSA for risk-informed decision 
making, e.g. for maintenance, service inspections and safety margins quantification in new NPPs 
design [Fleming, 2003; Duflot et., al, 2009; Zio et al., 2010]. 
A first attempt in developing computational methods for limiting the mcs combinatorial explosion 
of FTs without approximation has been to encode the Boolean formulae derived by the FTs into 
binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [Akers, 1978]. One of the major advantages of a BDD is that it 
provides exact values for probabilistic measures and it does not need any kind of truncation or 
approximation. However, BDD is highly memory consuming and very large models are beyond 
capability [Rauzy et al., 1997]. Another attempt for identifying mcs is the Dynamic Flowgraph 
Methodology (DFM), which is a directed graph-based approach to model and analyze the behavior 
of dynamic systems [Garrett et al., 1995]. The main drawback is scalability, in that realistic 
modeling causes a combinatorial explosion as the number of states in the system increases 
[Bjorkman, 2013]. In order to tackle this challenge, a DFM has been solved by a BDD (based on 
meta-products or on zero-suppressed BDD) [Bjorkman, 2013]. Also Petri nets suffer from the 
combinatorial explosion of the number of states, when applied to complex systems [Labeau et al., 
2000].  
We propose a novel approach to tackle the issue of exact mcs identification of coherent and non-
coherent FTs based on a Hierarchical Differential Evolution (HDE) algorithm. The Differential 
Evolution (DE) algorithm has been demonstrated to be an efficient, effective, fast and robust 
method for the identification of prime implicants (PIs) in simple non-coherent structure functions: a 
comparison with respect to a traditional analytical approach known as Quine-McCluskey algorithm 
and a Genetic Algorithm (GA) has been presented in [Di Maio et al., 2013]. In the present paper, 
DE is applied within a hierarchical scheme to deal with its computational limitations and avoid any 
approximation in the identification of mcs of complex coherent structure functions. With the 
proposed scheme, we look for the minimum combination of cut sets that can guarantee the best 
coverage of all the minterms that make the system fail: during the first step of the iteration process, 
a multiple-population, parallel search policy is implemented to expedite the convergence of the 
second step of the exploration algorithm. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to recalling some basic terminology (FT, 
Boolean Formulae, coherent and non-coherent structure functions, minterms, etc.). In Section 3, the 
HDE technique for mcs identification is presented. In Section 4.1, it is applied to the FT of a 
Reactor Protection System (RPS) of a PWR and its results are compared with those obtained with a 
DE algorithm, whereas in Section 4.2 the results of the application of HDE to the Airlock System 
(AS) of a CANDU reactor are shown. Conclusions and remarks are given in Section 5. 
2. TERMINOLOGY 
In this Section, we introduce the terminology used throughout the article with reference to FT 
analysis. The causal relations that lead to the FT top event can be described by a set of Boolean 
formulae built over a set of variables (literals) α1, α2, α3,... αn, and connectives (and, or, not, k-out-
of-n), whose semantics are defined by means of truth tables. By manipulation of the truth tables, the 
top event can be expressed in terms of the n primary events (e.g., components failures in our case of 
interest). The simplest way to express the structure function Φ, which relates the top event to the 
primary events, is in terms of minimal cut sets (mcs) *  , where   is the whole set of cut sets. 
A mcs is an irreducible combination of primary events (cut set  ), which if all verified cause the 
top event to occur. Then, a mcs *  is one of the 2
n
 products of literals (minterms), whose 
occurrence ensures the failure of the system *( ) 1   , while no proper subset of *  is a cut set 
[Epstein, 2005]. A structure function Φ is coherent if it can be expressed without any *  of 
complemented literals  , non-coherent otherwise.  
 
3. A NOVEL TECHNIQUE FOR MCS IDENTIFICATION 
We treat the problem of mcs identification as a set covering problem (SCP) [Beasley et al., 1996]. 
In the context of mcs identification, the SCP is the problem of covering each one of the minterms 
by a group of cut sets of minimal cost. We define the cost of a cut set Π as the number of literals α 
associated with system components included in the cut set (literal cost). Within the evolutionary 
optimization scheme here proposed, each solution of the SCP, ˆ ,optx  is represented by a specific 
combination of independent variables, or, mathematically speaking, by a R-dimensional vector 
1 2
( , ,..., )
R
x x x x  (hereafter called chromosome, within the jargon of the DE-optimization method 
adopted) where a value of 1 in the i-th vector position xi implies that Πi is chosen to be in the cover 
and vice versa a value of 0 [Sen, 1993]. The total cost of each possible solution ˆoptx  is defined as the 
combination of two parts: the literal cost of the cut sets selected to be in the cover and the cost 
associated with the number of faulty minterms left uncovered by the solution. 
3.1 Differential Evolution 
DE belongs to the class of Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs), which have proven effective in tackling 
optimization problems with high complexity, number of variables and dimensionality [Wang et al., 
2010]. DE search for the optimum entails three phases, called mutation, crossover and selection 
[Storn et al., 1997; Holland, 1975]. 
In the mutation phase, for each r-th bit 
r
x  of the NP chromosomes 
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R
x x x x  present in the 
population at the g-th generation, g=1,2,…,G, an estimation probability ( )
r
P x  is calculated: 
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where b is a positive real constant typically chosen ∈[6,9], F is a constant user-defined weighting 
factor typically chosen ∈[0,2] and ,  and l k m
r r r
x x x  are the r-th bit of three randomly chosen 
chromosomes with indexes  , , 1,2,...,l k m NP . From the probability estimation vector 
(1) 
        1 2, ,..., RP x P x P x P x , the corresponding bits of the noisy vector v  of the current 
chromosome x  are generated: 
1          if ( )
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r
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where rand is a uniform random number in [0,1). 
The r-th bit of the trial chromosome u
 
can be obtained by the crossover operator through Eq. (3): 
      if  or ( )
      otherwise
r
r
r
v rand CR r irand R
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x
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 
  
where [0,1]CR  is a control parameter which influences the probability for each r-th bit of v  to be 
selected, irand(R) is a uniform discrete random number from the set  1,2,..., R , where R is the 
length of the chromosome (i.e., the number of bits). Therefore, at least one bit of the trial 
chromosome u  is inherited from the mutant chromosome v  so that DE is able to avoid duplication 
of chromosomes x  and effectively search within the neighborhood; this contributes to maintaining 
the diversity inside the perturbed population, shuffling old and new information, and also increases 
the probability of maintaining some good properties from x , avoiding drastic changes during the 
generation of new solution.  
During the selection process, the population is modified by substitution. Referring to a 
minimization search, if the fitness of the trial chromosome u , i.e., the total cost of all Π belonging 
to u , is less than the fitness of x , the former will be a member of the g+1-th generation replacing 
the latter, or the latter will be maintained, otherwise: 
      ( ) ( )
     
u if fitness u fitness x
x
x otherwise

 

 
The fitness used in the DE applications that follow is called “One complement” fitness function 
[Shackleford et al., 2001]: it accounts for the literal cost of the Π selected to be in the cover and the 
cost associated with the number of faulty minterms left uncovered. In particular, the cost of the trial 
chromosome u
 
is mapped into a binary number made up by two parts: the most important digits are 
determined as the complement to one of the uncovered faulty minterms, whereas the least important 
digits are determined as the complement to one of the sum of the costs of the cut sets included in the 
trial cromosome. In this way, a complete subset of cut sets that covers all faulty minterms has surely 
a larger fitness than any other incomplete subset. Moreover, since the selection criterion of DE is 
greedy, for sure the following generation is better than or at least equal to the previous generation. 
 
3.2 Hierarchical Differential Evolution 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The novelty of the Hierarchical Differential Evolution (HDE) here proposed for mcs identification, 
builds on the setting of a two-steps DE optimization (The pseudocode is shown in Fig. 1). The first 
optimization is fed with subsets Γs, s=1, 2, ...,S, of the whole set Ω of cut sets Π, where the s-th 
subset Γs is generated by randomly assigning to it N cut sets Π of Ω in a way that each cut set 
belongs to only one subset, i.e.,    for   
s p
s p    , and the union of all the subsets is equal to 
all the cut sets, i.e. 
1
S
s
s
  . 
For each of the subsets 
s
 , s=1, 2, ...,S, 
1a) we build a cut set chart, using all the minterms as columns and the cut sets Π belonging to 
s
  as rows 
2a) we build the cost vector, where to each Π is assigned its literal cost 
3a) we perform the DE optimization (Section 3.1) 
4a) we find the best chromosomes {Π}s.  
The second DE optimization is performed on the new subset  
1
S
s
s
  comprising all the cut sets 
included in the best chromosomes  
s
  found at the end of the first optimization. In detail,  
1b) we build a new cut set chart, using all the minterms as columns and the cut sets belonging to 
 
1
S
s
s
  as rows  
2b) we build a new cost vector where to each cut set belonging to  
1
S
s
s
  is assigned its literal 
cost 
3b) we perform the DE optimization (Section 3.1) 
4b) we find the mcs *  of the system. 
 
Three performance indicators are used to judge the goodness of the results. In the evaluation, the 
optimizations are repeated a number of times (5 in our case), to account for the inherent 
stochasticity of the search algorithm. The three performance indicators are: 
- Cpu: cpu time (expressed in seconds) necessary to converge to the solution ˆoptx . 
- Success rate (Sr): percentage of trials for which the true optimum 
opt
x  is found. 
- Accuracy (λ): the larger λ, the larger the accuracy of the solution [Tvrdìk, 2006] as: 
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for 1:s S  
sample without replacement N  cut sets   from    
populate the s-th subset s  
end 
for 1:s S  
create an initial population of NP  potential solutions x  containing the R cut sets   belonging to the s-th 
subset s  
for 1:g G  
select (for each potential solution x ) three randomly chosen chromosomes for reproduction (Eq. 1) 
create (for each x ) a noisy vector v  using mutation process (Eq. 2) 
create a trial vector u  mixing x  and v  (Eq. 3) 
compare x  with each related trial u  and eventually replace (Eq. 4) 
end 
memorize all the cut sets Π contained in the s-th best solutions set  
s
  
end  
create an initial population of NP  potential solutions x  composed by  
s
 , 1,2,...,s S  
for 1:g G  
select (for each potential solution x ) three randomly chosen chromosomes for reproduction (Eq. 1) 
create (for each x ) a noisy vector v  using mutation process (Eq. 2) 
create a trial vector u  mixing x  and v (Eq. 3) 
compare x  with each related trial u  and eventually replace (Eq. 4) 
end 
memorize the best solution found ˆoptx  that contains the mcs 
*  
 
Fig. 1. Pseudocode of the HDE optimization technique 
 
 
4. APPLICATION TO NUCLEAR SAFETY SYSTEMS 
4.1. PWR Reactor Protection System analysis 
The procedure for mcs identification developed in Section 3 is here applied to the Reactor 
Protection System (RPS) of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) for the case of a small Loss of Coolant 
F
irst step
 D
E
 
S
eco
n
d
 step
 D
E
 
(5) 
Accident (LOCA) [Marseguerra et al., 2004]. The RPS is a multi-channel electrical alarm and 
actuating system that monitors the operation of the reactor. During normal control of the reactor, the 
rods are raised or lowered into the core by the use of magnetic jacks. Upon detection of an 
abnormal condition, RPS initiates counteracting actions to prevent a potentially unsafe condition: 
control rods are rapidly dropped into the core by removing the voltage to the magnetic jacks in 
order to allow the shutdown of the reactor. More precisely, control rod assemblies are dropped by 
removal of power through the opening of either the reactor trip breaker of  Train A (RTA) or of the 
reactor trip breaker of Train B (RTB) [Marseguerra et al., 2004]. The two trip breakers, connected 
in series, control the power provided by two motor generators connected in parallel. Each of them is 
bypassed by a special test breaker of the same type of the trip breakers, called bypass A (BYA) and 
bypass B (BYB), for RTA and RTB, respectively. The tripping signals which trip the breakers come 
from two relay logic trains which are identical in design, called Trip Train A (TrainA) and Trip 
Train B (TrainB). For prevention against possible interactions that may cause false scrams or failure 
to scram, the system trips on loss of electrical power and each trip channel is physically separated 
from the others and from other equipment [Schreiber et al., 2009].  
In this analysis, the top event of the RPS FT considered consists in at least 2 out of 48 rods failing 
to enter the core following a small LOCA, which leads to reactor scram [Wash-1400, 1976]. The 
failed insertion of the control rod can be originated by a core distortion (CD) (e.g., a change of the 
channel geometry due to the swelling of the fuel cladding) or by a failure in the rod drop (RDF). 
Wire faults (WF) are lumped into a single fault and a common mode failure (CMF) is considered, 
involving several trip circuit breaker faults and wire faults on each branch of the redundant trip 
breaker system. Trip trains (TrainA and TrainB) can even independently fail to deliver the signal to 
the RPS trip breakers, while the trip breakers (RTA and RTB) can fail upon receipt of a valid signal 
(e.g. due to sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment), as their bypass trip breakers (BYA and 
BYB). Operators interference in the correct automatic operation is considered during testing or 
maintenance operations (TestA and TestB). Therefore, CD, RDF, WF, CMF, TrainA, TrainB, RTA, 
RTB, BYA, BYB, TestA and TestB are considered as basic failure events (Tab. 1). The structure 
function Φ for the considered RPS failure event gives rise to 4096 minterms (4052 leading the RPS 
into failure state) and 485361 cut sets Π. Further details on the modeling assumptions, the detailed 
data for the reliability analysis and the FT for the considered top event can be found in [Wash-1400, 
1976]. For the sake of clarity, in Fig. 2, a sketch of the complete FR of the small LOCA for the RPS 
is provided. 
 
 Basic Failure Events ID Code 
1. Trip Train controlling RTA TrainA 
2. Trip Train controlling RTB TrainB 
3. Reactor trip breaker controlled by RPS Train A RTA 
4. Reactor trip breaker controlled by RPS Train B RTB 
5. Special test breaker bypassing RTA BYA 
6. Special test breaker bypassing RTB BYB 
7. RTA undergoing testing TestA 
8. RTB undergoing testing TestB 
9. Core distortion CD 
10. Failure in the rod drop  RDF 
11. Wire failure WF 
12. Common mode failure CMF 
Table 1. Basic failure events and failure codes for the RPS system 
The true solution 
opt
x  that will be used for comparison in the following subsections, has been 
obtained by traditional consolidated algorithms in [Wash-1400, 1976]: it consists in 15 mcs Π* 
({CD}, {RDF}, {WF}, {CMF}, {RTA, RTB}, {RTA, BYB}, {RTA, TrainB}, {RTB, BYA}, 
{RTB, TrainA}, {BYA, BYB}, {BYA, TrainB}, {BYB, TrainA}, {TrainA, TrainB}, {TrainA, 
TestB}, {TrainB, TestA}) [Marseguerra et al., 2004]. Moreover, the results provided by the 
proposed HDE will be also compared with a DE approach [Di Maio et al., 2013], for showing the 
improved capabilities of the HDE with respect to similar algorithms.   
 
Fig. 2. Partial reproduction of the complete FT of the of the RPS system [Wash-1400, 1976] 
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4.1.1. DE Results 
We apply to the RPS case study the DE approach [Di Maio et al., 2013] with a “One complement” 
fitness function [Shackleford et al., 2001] embedded into the evolutionary algorithm: since the 
columns in the cut set chart are 4052 (that is, equal to the number of minterms leading the system 
into failure state) 12 bits code the maximum number of uncovered columns, whereas 22 bits code 
the literal cost part of the trial solution because the sum of the literal cost of all the 485361 cut sets 
is equal to 3936648. In Fig. 3, the calculation procedure of the “One complement” fitness function 
is shown for the best solution 
opt
x  of the RPS mcs identification problem: in this particular case, the 
uncovered columns are equal to zero, whereas the total cost of the best solution 
opt
x  is equal to 
4·1+11·2=26 (i.e., 4 cut sets contain only one basic event and 11 contain 2 basic events); the 
complement to one of 0 on 12 bits is equal to 4095, and the complement to one of 26 on 22 bits is 
equal to 4194277; joining together the two parts of the fitness function gives a fitness value for 
opt
x  
equal to 17179869157.  
 
Fig. 3. Procedure for the calculation of the fitness function for the best solution of the RPS system 
In this application, parameters F and b (Eq. 1) and CR (Eq. 3) are set equal to the values reported in 
Tab. 2. 
Parameters 
F 0.1 
b 9 
CR 0.2 
Table 2. Values of the parameters F, CR and b used in the DE 
The analysis is performed for a population size NP=50, because this is the maximum value allowed 
by the computer memory constraints: the identification of the mcs for the RPS entails chromosomes 
of length R=485361 (i.e., the number of cut sets Π), and an allocated memory of NP R  bits (equal 
to 24268050, in our case); any further increase in NP is not allowed by the Matlab® software used 
in this work to develop the DE and HDE. The only stopping criterion is the generation number G 
set equal to MAXGEN=10000. Performance indicators are the same introduced in Section 2 and are 
quantified on a set of 5 trials of optimization.  Results of the DE optimizations are shown in Tab. 3. 
 
NP 50 
Cpu [s] 91157.80 
Sr 0 % 
λ 2.16 
 
Tab. 3. Performance indicators for the DE-based algorithm, with NP=50 
It is seen that in this real case with a large number of minterms and cut sets, DE is not capable of 
finding the true solution 
opt
x   (found in [Wash-1400, 1976] by traditional consolidated algorithms) 
among all the cut sets (Sr=0%), due to the hardware computational capability that limit the 
population size to NP=50. To overcome this limitation, we apply HDE to the FT of the RPS. 
4.1.2. HDE Results 
In accordance with the procedural steps presented in Section 3.2 and Fig. 1, we partition Ω into 
S=50 subsets Γs (39 subsets composed by 9707 cut sets and 11 subsets composed by 9708 cut sets): 
the number of the cut sets belonging to each Γs is chosen guided by the fact that the DE has shown 
good results (in terms of success rate (Sr)) when applied to cut sets groups smaller than 10000 [Di 
Maio et al., 2013]. For each Γs, its cut set chart and its cost vector are built as shown in Section 3.2. 
When parameters F, b, CR are set as in Table 2, NP=100 and MAXGEN=1500, the total time 
approximately required for the first level optimization is 25721 [s] on an Intel® Core™ i5.2500 
CPU @3.30GHz. 
The number of cut sets Π found by the first step of the optimization is 1510, among which the 
second step DE will search for the mcs *.  For this, the cut set chart and the cost vector associated 
to the new cut sets are defined as shown in Section 3.2. As for the first optimization step, the 
parameters F, b, CR are set equal to the values reported in Tab. 2, NP=100 and MAXGEN=1500. 
The mcs found by the HDE are the same as those reported in [Marseguerra et al., 2004], proving the 
HDE procedure effective in finding the mcs in large structure functions. The cpu time required for 
the second-step optimization is equal to 990.71 [s]. Thus, the total time required by the HDE 
optimization is equal to 26700 [s], much shorter than for the DE (Table 3).  
 For showing the better results of HDE with respect to DE, in Fig. 4, the evolution of the difference 
Δ between the fitness values of 
opt
x
 
 and  ˆ
opt
x  is shown on a semi-logarithmic plot. HDE shows 
superior convergence performance. In fact, in the first step of the optimization (continuous line with 
circles) it achieves better results than DE (continuous line with triangles) by resorting to a larger 
population for exploring a reduced and focused search space, whereas in the second step of the 
optimization (continuous line with stars) it explores an even more reduced search space made up of 
the selected best chromosomes  
1
S
s
s
  reaching Δ=0 in only 2200 generations. It is worth pointing 
out that, with respect to the accuracy of the solution found and the success rate of HDE (for a set of 
5 trials), at the end of the first optimization stage it is meaningless to calculate Sr and λ, because the 
true solution 
opt
x  might not be included into the set of solutions {Π}s of the S subsets s . On the 
other hand, at the end of the second optimization step, HDE provides Sr=100% and λ=11. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Fitness function convergence using ordinary DE and HDE 
In principle, the extension to a hierarchical, multi-step, DE-based algorithm for mcs identification is 
straightforward, allowing the treatment of very large systems. It is always feasible to group the 
possible solutions in different subgroups and then run a different optimization for each subgroup 
until the solution converges to the optimum of the fitness function. In other words, applying a 
hierarchical DE-based procedure, the NP-complete problem [Sen, 1993] associated to the mcs 
identification of a complex (even non-coherent) structure function can be tackled in such way that 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
10
0
10
2
10
4
10
6
Generation Number
"
=
-
tn
es
s(
7x
op
t)
-
-
tn
es
s(
x^
op
t)
 
 
DE
HDE, 1st step
HDE, 2nd step
Δ
=
fi
tn
e
s
s
( 
   
 
  
- 
fi
tn
e
s
s
(  
   
 
  
the computational complexity of the problem grows linearly with the number of subgroups 
dimension and not exponentially, as it is when resorting to the single DE optimization. 
4.2. CANDU Airlock System 
A second application of the HDE for mcs identification considers the FT developed for 
analyzing a scenario of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) occurred in 2011 in the Airlock System 
(AS) of a CANDU NPP [Lee et al., 2012; Di Maio et al., 2013b]. The AS is a safety system 
required to keep the pressure of the inner side of the reactor vault lower than the outer side in order 
to avoid the dispersion of contaminants out of the reactor bay, in case of accident. Therefore, the FT 
top event is the incapability of the AS to maintain the pressure boundary [Lee et al., 2012]. The 
system consists of a vessel in the containment wall of the reactor vault, with two doors in order to 
allow the inspection of the vault: one door opens towards the inside of the reactor vault, the other 
towards the outside; so, at least one airlock door, whose seals are normally inflated via the air 
system, must be closed by a latch with sufficient pressure in the seals to fulfill its safety function. 
During the accident, the inflation of the seals is switched to the back-up air supply tank. Possible 
causes for the top event occurrence can be: the pressure equalizer valve fails (V1), doors fail to 
close because latches are not locked (D1) and seals are cracked or cannot be inflated (S1). The 
pressure equalizer valves are designed to equalize the pressure between the reactor bay and the 
service side and, therefore, to allow controlled flow between these two areas. The pressure 
equalization can fail due to gear box failure (G1) that may limit the vents from opening and closing, 
to the presence of leakages in the piping system (P1/P2) or to the failure of the exhaust pipe (E1). 
The airlock doors must be closed by a latch, otherwise the pressure equalizer valves and seals 
cannot be called in operation on demand. In addition, the possibility is considered that the back-up 
tank is already empty (T1) or fails to engage (T2) when the inflation of the seals is switched to the 
back-up air supply system. The basic failure events that can give rise to the AS failure are listed in 
Table 6. 
 Basic Failure Events ID Code 
1. Pressure equalizer valve is failed V1 
2. Doors fail to close and lock D1 
3. Seals are cracked S1 
4. Gearbox fails G1 
5. The piping system presents minor leakages P1 
6. The piping system presents major leakages P2 
7. Exhaust pipe fails open E1 
8. Back up tank is empty T1 
9. Back up tank fails to engage T2 
Tab. 6. Basic failure events and failure codes for a DBA in a CANDU AS [Di Maio et al., 2013b] 
The FT for the DBA here considered is shown in Fig. 5 [Lee et al., 2012]. The structure 
function expression is        1 and 1  or 1 and 1 or 1 or 1  or 1 or 2 or 2  or 1G E T S V P V T P D     . 
There are 497 minterms leading to the system failure, 16867 cut sets and 7 mcs * =({D1}, {P2}, 
{T2}, {V1}, {E1,G1}, {P1,T1}, {S1,T1}) as found in  [Lee et al., 2012] by traditional consolidated 
algorithms for mcs identification.  
 
Fig. 5. FT for the DBA of the AS [Lee et al., 2012] 
 
4.2.1. HDE Results 
In Fig. 6 the calculation procedure of the “One Complement” fitness function is shown for the 
best solution: in the problem of the AS of the CANDU, where the columns of its cut set chart are 
497 (that is, equal to the number of minterms), 9 bits code the maximum number of uncovered 
columns, whereas the sum of the cost of all the 16867 cut sets is equal to 103298 so that 17 bits 
code the cost part of the trial solution. The uncovered columns are equal to zero, while the total cost 
of the best solution is equal to 10 (4 cut sets contain only one basic event and 3 contain 2 basic 
events); the complement to one of 0 on 9 bits is equal to 511, and the complement to one of 10 on 
17 bits is equal to 131061; joining together this two parts of the fitness function gives a fitness 
value for 
opt
x  equal to 67108853. 
 
 Fig. 6. Procedure for the calculation of the fitness function for the best solution of the CANDU AS 
 
In the proposed two-step HDE framework, we have set the number of subsets Γs  equal to S=10 and 
the number of minimal cut sets Π of Ω  equal to N=1687 for each s-th subset Γ. We perform the 
first-stage DE optimization with a population size equal to NP=500 and stopping criterion 
“maximum number of generation”, MAXGEN=700. The mean cpu time required for performing the 
optimization on a single s-th subset is equal to 607.20 [s]. At this first optimization stage, the 
number of cut sets is 100 and the true solution 
opt
x  does not belong to any of the S subsets. 
However, it is worth pointing out that on Intel® Core™ i5.2500 CPU @3.30GHz the computational 
demand approximately required for the first step is 1214.40 s. 
We perform the second DE optimization comprising all the 100 cut sets included in the best 
individuals  
s
  found at the end of the first optimization. The population size equal to NP=500 
and MAXGEN=200. The mcs found by the HDE are the same as those reported in [Lee et al., 2012], 
proving that the HDE is capable of identifying the exact mcs *  of a complex system as the AS of a 
CANDU. The cpu time required for the second step optimization is equal to 19.76s making the total 
time required by the HDE optimization equal to 1233s. 
For further comparison of the results with other similar algorithms, in Fig. 7 the faster convergence 
obtained by the HDE compared with DE with NP=700 is shown: the faster evolution towards zero 
of the difference Δ between the fitness values of 
opt
x
 
 and ˆoptx  of HDE highlights its superior 
performance. In fact, in the first step of the optimization (continuous line with circles) it achieves 
better results than DE (continuous line with triangles) by resorting to a larger population for 
exploring a reduced search space, whereas in the second step of the optimization (continuous line 
with stars) it explores an even more reduced search space made up of best individuals, reaching 
Δ=0 in only 800 generations, whereas around 1550 generations are needed for DE such that Δ=0. 
As a final remark, it is worth pointing out that, in this latter case, i) the number of generations 
needed for Δ=0 is much smaller than for the RPS case study of Section 4.1.2 and ii) DE is still 
capable of finding the solution 
opt
x  of the mcs identification problem, whereas in Fig. 7 the 
unfeasibility of resorting to DE for the RPS case study is clear. This is due to the fact that the 
number of components of the RPS case study is larger than that of the AS here considered. 
 
Fig. 7. Fitness function convergence using DE and HDE 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The exact identification of the mcs of FTs is an important task in PSA. It becomes non-trivial for 
systems that are composed by large numbers of components. In this paper, we have addressed this 
issue by proposing a novel HDE algorithm. This amounts to transferring the mcs identification into 
a hierarchical optimization problem: during the first step, a multiple-population, parallel DE search 
policy is used to expedite the convergence of a second step of DE exploration. The proposed 
method has been applied for the analysis of a RPS of a PWR and a AS of a CANDU. The superior 
HDE performance is evident when the number of basic events in the FT is large.  
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